Post 9/11, understanding how people become terrorists has come to be discussed in terms of "radicalisation". Today, radicalisation is typically seen to refer to a complex and dynamic process which results in individuals coming to embrace a violent ideology in support of a political or religious cause. Without doubt, the issue of radicalisation has become a core fixture of contemporary efforts to understand and combat terrorism. Yet, clearly, terrorism has an extraordinarily long history and what is called radicalisation today, in the past was referred to do much more mundanely as "becoming" a terrorist, "joining" a terrorist group, or of being "recruited". 1 No one talked of the IRA being radicalised, or Shining Path, or Black September or the Red Brigades. Though all of these older groups certainly were by our modern understanding.
as outcome. Its broader application to political activism of individuals and movements in societies where social development is blocked by non-democratic extremist regimes is problematical. 4 Terrorism as a term has also been mired with similar difficulties in how it has been defined, though this has not restricted the enormous growth in terrorism studies in recent years, or research on a bewildering range of topics linked to the area. 5 Similarly, the development of theoretical models and research on radicalisation has been enormous in recent years, and the focus of this chapter is to attempt to review some of the major developments in our understanding of radicalisation and the significant issues connected to the phenomenon.
Theoretical Models of Radicalisation
The past decade has been an exceptionally vibrant period for the development of models of radicalisation. 6 New research has fuelled a plethora of theories around what factors and processes drive radicalisation, and provided a range of sometimes very different 2 perspectives on the issue. There is not enough space in this chapter to review all of these models, but we can focus attention on some of the major ones, bearing in mind that it is likely that new models will continue to emerge and many of the current ones will be refined further.
Moghaddam's Staircase Model of Radicalisation
Fathali Moghaddam's staircase model was one of the first detailed models and since its publication in 2005 it has become one of the most influential of the theoretical models. 7 In a recent review it was identified as among the 100 most cited articles on terrorism. 8 The model presents radicalisation as a phased process, involving six stages in total. Figure 1 provides an outline of the model. 
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There are six stages in total and each stage is represented by a different step in the staircase. The higher you progress in the model, the fewer the number of people who reach each level, and the step metaphor is designed to reflect that progress through the different phases is not automatic or inevitable. The ground level of the model starts with perceptions of discontent and a desire by individuals to improve their situation. If they are unsuccessful in doing this, feelings of frustration and anger develop towards any entity individuals believe are responsible for these setbacks. Moral disengagement from standard social norms occurs as the individual increasingly begins to adopt the moral framework of the terrorist group or cause. This deepens as the individual progresses up the staircase, to the point where in the final stage they are incorporated within the terrorist movement and are willing to carry out acts of violence on behalf of the cause.
McCauley and Moskalenko's 12 mechanism model
Published in 2008, the McCauley and Moskalenko model argues that radicalisation can happen at three different levels: individual, group and mass. 9 Within this framework, each level might best be considered as comprising a set of different pathways leading to radicalisation, and 12 different mechanisms as to how this can happen are described. as if it will become a quite influential theory. 12 The model effectively emerged from research studies exploring the role of significance quest in terrorist motivation. Studies in the area suggest that the move towards an extremist ideology is for many a way of dealing with perceived inadequacy and failure in their own lives, and of attempting to increase their own self-esteem and sense of significance. 13 How the model works is outlined in figure 2. As even the brief review of theoretical models in the previous section illustrates, there is no single root cause of radicalisation. Indeed, more than 200 different factors have been identified by research which could play a role in the radicalisation process. 16 Not all of these factors feature in every case, and there is often very considerable variation. Ultimately, radicalisation is not simply the sum of different factors, but rather that the different factors seem to play a role at different stages in the process. 17 Key events can motivate individuals 7 to radicalise further or to de-radicalise, and overall radicalisation is best seen as a complex, non-linear and dynamic process.
The general trend in research findings though is that radicalisation is the result of the interaction of both personal factors (e.g. individual susceptibility) and environmental factors (e.g. social relationships, community attitudes). 18 Studies have also highlighted that static and dynamic factors both play significant roles in radicalisation. Static elements include, for example, demographic factors such that young people aged 15-24 are most at risk, and males are usually more affected than females. 19 Dynamic factors can include social relationships, which in most cases are probably one of key elements in the radicalisation process. Camaraderie, social support and a sense of belonging can all be powerful incentives for becoming and staying involved with a radical group. 20 In his analysis of the life histories of hundreds of jihadi terrorists, Edwin Bakker for example found that these individuals tended to become involved in terrorism through networks of friends or relatives and that generally there were no formal ties with terrorist networks. 21 More recent research suggests that in up to 20% of cases family members played a key role in introducing and initiating to an extremist movement. In contrast, friends played the key role in almost 50% of cases. 22 Psychological vulnerability can also play a significant role, though this should not be confused with mental illness or serious psychological problems, which overall are present in relatively few cases of serious radicalisation. 23 The presence of an extremist ideology is a further factor, though the key element here is probably around how an individual latches onto the ideology and incorporates elements of it within their own identity. The transformation of the individual's identity is an important dimension, rather than, for example, nuances within the ideology. Indeed, radicalised individuals can often have a surprisingly simplistic and shallow understanding of the ideology. 24 In the following section we will explore in more detail a selection of these different factors which have been linked with the radicalisation process.
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Psychological Vulnerability to Radicalisation
The issue of psychological vulnerability to radicalisation has attracted growing attention, though there is variation in how this is interpreted and assessed. 25 A range of psychological factors have been identified as important to radicalisation including: issues of grievance, perceived injustice, identity, anger, revenge and a quest for significance. Certainly, most extremists believe at the time of their offending that their actions are morally justified, and various psychological processes (such as deindividuation, mortality salience, moral disengagement and risky shift) appear to play an important role in facilitating their involvement. 26 We can now consider some of these issues in more detail.
Quest for Significance
Quest for significance has already been discussed in relation to Kruglanski et al.'s model of radicalisation. 27 One of the key findings in this regard is that perceived success in life appears to be a factor in radicalisation. Individuals who perceive themselves as less successful identify more with their religion or nationality. Kruglanski et al. explained this in terms of a collectivistic shift. Of concern here are studies that show that people who see their identity primarily in these terms are more likely to express support for extremist violence. Other research shows that feelings of shame or insignificance correlate with support for extremism and political violence. 28 Linked to this, recent research in the UK has found that Muslim individuals with symptoms of mild depression were more likely to express support for terrorism and political protest. 29 Thus, the gravitation towards an extremist ideology is for many a way of dealing with perceived inadequacy and failure in their own lives, and of attempting to increase their own self-esteem and sense of significance.
How someone sees their identity appears to be an important factor. 30 there is a strong relationship between self-reported life failure (or lack of success), and greater identification as a member of a collective (nation or religion). Those who experience a loss of significance are more likely to then adopt collective ideologies that will provide them with significance. Once someone has adopted a group-centred identity, studies show they are more likely to engage in activity in support of that group.
Self-Esteem
Linked with the quest for significance, many theories have assumed that individuals with lower levels of self-esteem can be more vulnerable to radicalisation. 31 In this framework, the extremist ideology can offer people a way to enhance their self-esteem. Recent research results, however, suggest a more complex picture with self-esteem effects. Low self-esteem is associated with increased vulnerability to radicalisation, but so too, is high self-esteem.
Found that individuals with moderate levels of self-esteem seemed to be the most resilient to violent radicalisation. 32 Added to this, is the related finding from other research studies that people at early stages of radicalisation can show low self-esteem, but individuals at later stages (who have been heavily radicalised) actually report high self-esteem (a result of embracing the ideology and the message that the individual is an active member of a valued in-group). 33 
Mortality Salience
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When people are exposed to death-related thoughts or imagery this results in what psychologists refer to as a 'mortality salience' effect. Psychological research has shown that even very subtle cues relating to death can create mortality salience effect -even when the cues are not consciously recognised by the person involved. 34 Mortality salience has a number of psychological effects. After exposure to such images people will usually feel an increasing pride in and identification with their country, religion, gender, race, etc. They experience exaggerated tendencies to stereotype and reject those who are different from themselves. The group you belong to is even better than it was before, even more worthy of your support. Your rivals though are diminished, less deserving of sympathy or compassion. People feel greater hostility toward those who are perceived as different others or as a threat.
These changes in attitude and perceptions are also linked to changes in behaviour. Some of these are relatively subtle, such as sitting closer to a person who shares your own culture, while moving further away from foreigners. Others are starker, including increased physical aggression toward anyone critical of cherished beliefs.
Crucially, mortality salience has also been found to lead to an increase in support for extremism when it is linked to group identity. For example, one study found that under mortality salience conditions white Americans expressed more sympathy and support for other Whites who expressed racist views. In the Middle East, researchers found that Muslim students under mortality salience conditions expressed more support and sympathy for suicide bombers, and also expressed a greater willingness to carry out suicide attacks themselves. 35 The more that important cultural icons and beliefs (e.g. in the context of militant jihadi terrorism, reference to the Quran, the Prophet Mohammed, and other vital aspects of Islam) are involved, then the more pronounced that the effect is likely to be. Mortality salience leads to an increased attachment and protectiveness towards such beliefs and also produces increased hostility and aggression to others who appear to be denigrating or insulting such icons and beliefs.
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Altruism and Self-Sacrifice
Perhaps strangely, many people see their involvement with an extremist movement as a pro-social activity, and altruism has been identified as a potential factor in radicalisation. 36 Altruistic tendencies can be increased by stressing similarities with others. The stronger a person can identify with others the more they care about what happens to them. In contrast, stressing the differences weakens such bonds and interest and concern declines. Altruism is likely to have an impact on support for extremism when it is considered within the context of identity. Individuals who feel their identity is closer to the militant group, and who score higher on altruistic measures, are arguably the ones who will express and feel the strongest support for the group including the group's use of extreme measures. Potentially, they will also be more likely to act on these sentiments.
Importantly, studies show that measures of altruism correlate closely with measures of the psychological willingness to self-sacrifice. 37 Both of these factors also match closely measures of having a commitment to higher causes -causes which provide meaning in people's lives. Self-sacrifice is also linked to an increased willingness to engage in extreme actions, to endure personal suffering and hardship on behalf of a cause, and feeling angry towards people who do not respect that cause.
Radicalisation and Children and Teenagers
Many individuals can become engaged with violent extremist movements at very young age and adolescence, in particular, seems to be a critical period. Why adolescence is so important appears to relate to issues around identity and negative emotions. Establishing a clear sense of identity is a normal part of adolescence. The concern with radicalisation is when identity gravitates towards an ideology-based violence and is shaped by this. This is more likely to happen in cases where the young person has a strong identification with an (ethnic and religious) in-group; where they perceive this in-group as superior; yet, where they also perceive that this in-group has been humiliated by others. 38 The psychological background can be marked by negative emotions and a quest for significance.
Self-esteem may be low at the start of the process, but can rise as the individual embrace's the radical ideology and incorporates this more and more into their own sense of identity.
Young people with high personal uncertainty (e.g. who experience higher levels of anxiety and confusion) can be more inclined to support ideology-based violence. Researchers argue that uncertainty is a distressing feeling, and that people are fundamentally motivated to achieve a sense of certainty about themselves and their social worth. This can make extremist ideologies which provide a clear "black and white" worldview that minimizes ambiguity and uncertainty very attractive, and indeed, studies show that people gravitate towards radical beliefs when they experience high levels of uncertainty. Also, young people who have a higher sense of agency (i.e. feel that they understand themselves and their roles) appear more willing to actually act on violent intentions. Important background environmental factors which contribute to all this, can be negative situations at home, the presence and endorsement of the ideology among their peers and family, and negative key events in their personal lives. 39
Gender and Radicalization
Recent research shows that the recruitment of young men and women to terrorist causes can be highly gendered and operates on two levels. 40 How this happens can be well illustrated by examining recent developments with regard to militant jihadist radicalization, particularly with regard to Islamic State (IS). At the first level, recruitment focuses on critiquing gendered globalized societal patterns and norms, and second, targeting individual lives. These two layers of propaganda and recruitment reinforce each other, and provide a broad alignment of public values with private aspirations. 13 The first globalized narratives are produced on a mass scale and distributed via a range of media and platforms, from ask.fm, Instagram, Facebook, and twitter, to online video channels and dedicated websites. Klaussen's in-depth analysis of IS online material reveals that less than 10% of material is concerned with violence. 41 important -purity meaning of femininity/masculinity tied to morality and of faith.
The Online Environment and Social Media
The past decade has seen enormous attention focused on questions around the role that the online environment and social media play in radicalization. 49 While the online environment is hugely diverse and public platforms are used for propagating messages, recruitment of members (rather than merely sympathizers) requires more personalized forms of communication. They often use closed forum and messaging platforms, such as
Telegram and WhatsApp. Islamic state 'groups' is increasingly suspicious of unsolicited requests, and some reports suggest they require a 'recommendation' from a 'known'/'trusted' individual. This became evident in the Channel 4 Dispatches programmes aired in November 2015, where the undercover reporter had considerable difficulty accessing groups that 'met in real life' and she was finally ousted from a meeting because she couldn't allay the lead woman's fears that she wasn't carrying a camera in her bag 50 .
Closest links seem to be with siblings 51 As the discussions show, the material offers a utopian vision 57 of itself -it identifies a problem with the world and living in the West, it presents an awe-inspiring and grand solution (itself), argues that young Muslims are responsible for its realization, and offers 'hope' for a future. There is an underlying tension with this approach where it emphasises a new 'good life' for potential recruits while simultaneously highlighting their belief in an imminent apocalypse. However this does not render IS a 'death cult': rather, death and violence is for a purpose -the protection of the new proto-state, and its 'citizens'. They link these global narratives of masculinity, politics and femininity to ideas about individuals' behaviours, by bridging the individual, or private world, with public global narratives. Islamic
State has been more successful in that than other groups.
Conclusions
Our understanding of how people become involved in terrorism and violent extremism has transformed since the turn of the century. That transformation occurred at the same time that 'radicalisation' took over as the dominant framework for considering questions around terrorist psychology, motivation and recruitment. Yet, is it a case that the major breakthroughs in understanding have happened because 'radicalisation' is a genuinely useful concept that has facilitated this progress? Or is it simply the inevitable result of the massive amount of research which has been focused on terrorism and terrorists in the wake of 9/11?
While radicalisation as a concept has troublesome baggage, it has nevertheless worked as an overarching theme for research on questions looking at support for and involvement in violent extremism. In this regard, it has arguably proven both more flexible and more cohesive than the previous frameworks. It has almost certainly made it easier to connect together disparate research findings across a range of academic disciplines. Combined then with the huge and sustained increase in scientific research across the area, significant progress seems almost inevitable.
Yet, while progress has been made, there are still very significant gaps in our understanding.
Much of the evidence base remains seriously weak. Good quality studies have trickled in, but more are still needed. At this stage, it is clearly critical to remember that radicalisation is the result of many factors, some of which are about the individual involved, and some of which relate to their environment (including family and community). The range of factors involved is extensive, and the result is that radicalisation processes are complex and varied.
Radicalisation itself is not a fixed state, but is dynamic, and changing events and factors can either deepen radicalisation or bring about de-radicalisation.
We also need to be careful in terms of how we think about the broader role of radicalisation. A subtle assumption has spread that 'radicalisation' as a phenomenon is the major root cause of terrorism. Yet, it is surely more accurate to see radicalisation as the recruitment processes. Other causes drive these processes, and it is these causes which merit attention and intervention. Added to this, many models of radicalisation seem weakly linked to the evidence we have regarding the structural causes of terrorism. 58 When 18 different models are used to design or justify a variety of counter-terrorism policies and programmes, care is needed to look beyond the headline banner of radicalisation and pay attention to the causes identified within that model as key factors. Failing to do that, risks leading counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism down false roads.
